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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Office of Current Intelligence  
27 February 1963

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Ghana-US Relations

1. Since Edgar Kaiser and Chad Calhoun interviewed Nkrumah on 19 January, the volume of Ghanaian press and radio attacks on the United States has dropped considerably. Nkrumah has also made some effort to assuage the fears of private businessmen, and his government is preparing a capital investment act to protect overseas investors.

2. Positive examples of a change in the Ghanaian attitude, however, have been few and far between. Press attacks on the US have not ceased entirely, and some of them--notably the reaction to a 23 January speech by Attorney General Robert Kennedy and the 25 February article in the Ghanaian Times on CIA--have been extremely vitriolic. The Ghanaians are still preventing the transit of American diplomatic couriers across the Ghana-Togo border. Although they withdrew one of the three notes requesting the recall of the American Embassy's medical officer, the other two are still outstanding. Vague charges against another embassy official have been neither withdrawn nor elaborated. The Kaiser-Calhoun interview may have persuaded Nkrumah to call off for the time being the efforts of some of his supporters to implicate these officials in the long-delayed "show trial" of alleged oppositionists; the issue has not been resolved, however, and Nkrumah may still press for the expulsion of the two Americans if radicals such as Attorney General Bing have their way.

3. The overall Ghanaian foreign posture has not changed significantly. However, Nkrumah's recent utterances may have been a shade more "independent" and African-oriented; witness his criticism of the USSR's prompt recognition of a "neocolonialist-dominated" regime in Iraq, coupled with his strictures against the

**SECRET**

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**SECRET**

Soviet reluctance to follow his lead in recognizing Togo. The lid which he recently clamped on press criticism of the Bulgarian treatment of its African students shows the narrow limits within which this "independence" operates.

4. The influence of the West will be limited, as it has been in the past, by the constellation of advisers who surround Nkrumah at Flagstaff House. Most of them are opposed to the West, and many of them are extreme leftists. This group includes Bing, whose principal recent concern has been the investigations pointing toward the "show trial;" foreign affairs adviser Dei-Anang, who is anti-West but not pro-bloc; press overseer Cecil Forde; and private secretary Okoh, who tried to keep Kaiser from contacting Nkrumah in late December 1962. These individuals and their associates control most of Nkrumah's outside contacts and have numerous opportunities to influence his thought; moreover, they have had direct control, subject to Nkrumah's general supervision, of the anti-Western press program and of the attempts to link the United States to internal subversion.

5. It seems likely that the Kaiser-Calhoun visit did expose Nkrumah to the realities of American concern over Ghanaian policy, but it did not change his basic assumptions. He remains deeply suspicious of anything which can be construed as "neocolonialism," and he still has a bias favoring socialist concepts of organization. These attitudes will keep him from developing any significantly closer ties to the West in general. The Kaiser-Calhoun interview did prove that political pressure and personal contact can modify his attitude somewhat, but the effect of such influences is likely to be vitiated by his own prejudices and by the outlook of his Flagstaff House coterie.

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